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A RESPONSIVE REMEDY FOR
UNCONSTITUTIONAL REMOVAL
RESTRICTIONS
William C. Eisenhauer*
INTRODUCTION
This Note is about unsupervised power, and what to do when it
inflicts harm.
Most executive officials wield “supervised” executive power; the
President may fire them at any time, for any reason. The Damocles’
sword1 of removal keeps their power in check. Knowing that their job
is safe only to the extent that the President is satisfied with their
performance provides a strong incentive for executive officials not to
overstep their station.
But as the sword disappears, so too does the incentive. Unsupervised executive officials—those with tenure protection or so-called
removal restrictions—need not fear the repercussions of their actions.2
The President is statutorily prohibited from firing them at will. But
removal restrictions have constitutional limits. When Congress has
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2023; B.S., United States Naval Academy,
2015. I thank Professor A.J. Bellia for his patience and insightful commentary. I also thank
my peers on the Notre Dame Law Review for their prodigious work ethics and meticulous
editing. Finally, I thank my wife, Kelly, for her endless love and support.
1 See MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, CICERO’S TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS; ALSO, TREATISES
ON THE NATURE OF THE GODS, AND ON THE COMMONWEALTH 185–86 (C.D. Yonge trans.,
N.Y., Harper & Brothers 1877) (45 C.E.) (describing the tale of Damocles, in which a sword
is constantly suspended over the king’s neck, hanging by a thread, symbolizing the burden
felt by those in positions of power).
2 The incentives this structure creates are fairly intuitive. See Marjorie Cohn, The
Politics of the Clinton Impeachment and the Death of the Independent Counsel Statute: Toward
Depoliticization, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 59, 68–70 (1999) (describing the expansive prosecutorial
jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, a tenure-protected executive official
whose investigation received criticism for expanding beyond its initial scope in the
Whitewater and Lewinsky scandals during President Clinton’s tenure); Mike Rappaport,
Essay, Lawrence Walsh and the Abuse of Power, LAW & LIBERTY (Mar. 24, 2014), https://
lawliberty.org/lawrence-walsh-and-the-abuse-of-power/ [https://perma.cc/D66X-TZQ3]
(describing the perceived excesses of tenure-protected Independent Counsel Lawrence
Walsh, whose investigation into the Iran-Contra affair spanned six years).
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exceeded those limits, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to hold
the offending restrictions unconstitutional. In doing so, however, it
has failed to develop a consistent approach for the remedy a victorious
plaintiff may receive.
The Supreme Court has inconsistently approached the remedies
in unlawful removal restriction cases. This inconsistency fails to
redress plaintiffs injured by unlawful executive power, blurs the
separation of powers, and discourages other constitutional actors from
considering their actions’ implications.3 This Note proposes a straightforward solution to those problems.
It begins in Part I by laying out the mechanics of appointment and
removal, with special attention to the constitutional and precedential
intricacies of the removal power. Part II introduces the remedial
problem by describing the Supreme Court’s two most recent removal
cases and identifying the problematic inconsistencies. Part III discusses in depth the 2021 case Collins v. Yellen and introduces the
dueling remedial approaches the Justices applied in that case. Finally,
Part IV expands upon and argues for Justice Gorsuch’s approach: that
an unlawful removal restriction renders an official’s power per se
invalid, and thus entitles successful plaintiffs to a per se remedy.
I.

A PRIMER ON EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL

Executive officials wield “[t]he executive Power.”4 The Constitution does not precisely delineate what that power entails, but a few
things are clear. First, the executive power “shall be vested in a
President of the United States.”5 The singular nature of the
determiner “a” means that the Constitution grants one individual the
whole of the executive power.6 The Constitution later directs only this
individual—the President—to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.”7 But the Framers envisioned that the President would have
help. Because of “[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to
perform all the great business of the State,” the Constitution
contemplates executive officials to assist the President.8 Its drafters
3 See Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil—Remedies for Regulated Parties in
Separation-of-Powers Litigation, 92 N.C. L. REV. 481, 489 (2014).
4 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
5 Id. (emphasis added).
6 For a historical introduction to the unitary executive theory, see STEVEN G.
CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 30–36 (2008).
7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
8 Letter from George Washington to Eléonor François Élie, Comte de Moustier (May
25, 1789), reprinted in 30 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES 1745–1799, at 334 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
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wrote the Take Care Clause in the passive voice; it does not require the
President himself to faithfully execute all the laws. In addition, several
Clauses in Article II expressly mention executive “Officers”9 and
“Departments.”10 The Appointments Clause then grants the President
the power to, in most cases, choose those officers.11
What is equally clear, though, is that Congress may encroach on
the President’s power to staff the executive branch as he sees fit.12 The
Constitution does not expressly grant Congress this power, but it grants
Congress the authority to create offices.13 And with the power to create
comes the power to dictate the terms of existence, at least in some
respects. For certain executive offices, those terms have taken the form
of tenure protection.14 Tenure protections—often called “for cause”
removal restrictions—theoretically insulate executive officials from
political pressures, both within and without the government.15 This
9 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The Appointments Clause gives the President the
power to staff the executive branch with “Officers of the United States.” Id.
10 Id. The Opinion Clause empowers the President to order “the principal Officer in
each of the executive Departments” to provide a written statement “upon any Subject
relating to the Duties of their respective Offices.” Id.
11 This power is not unchecked, as the Constitution also requires the Senate to
confirm noninferior officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. In addition, Congress may by
law vest the President himself, the “Heads of Departments,” and the “Courts of Law” with
the power to appoint inferior officers. Id.
12 See Neomi Rao, Removal: Necessary and Sufficient for Presidential Control, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 1205, 1212–13 (2014) (“A proper account of presidential control must take into
account both the significance of the vesting of executive power in one President as well as
the specific grant of power to Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”).
13 See Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VA. L. REV. 1779, 1788
(2006) (“[T]he Constitution strongly implies that Congress must create all offices that the
Constitution itself does not establish.”). Prakash cites the Appointments Clause’s language
that the President shall nominate officers “whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law” for the implication that Congress must
establish offices that the Constitution itself does not specify. Id. at 1788 n.30 (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2). Congress’s power pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause
provides whatever support may still be required for this proposition. See McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 323–24 (1819).
14 For an early and controversial example of tenure protection, see the Act of March
2, 1967, ch. 154, § 2, 14 Stat. 430, 430 (1867). The “Tenure of Office Act” restricted the
President’s power to suspend an executive official while the Senate was not in session. Id.
If, when the Senate reconvened, it did not ratify the official’s suspension, that official was
to be reinstated, notwithstanding the President’s dissatisfaction. Id. This Act sparked the
conflict that culminated in President Andrew Johnson’s impeachment. See Andrew Johnson,
THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents
/andrew-johnson/ [https://perma.cc/95T8-MMG6].
15 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5841(e) (2018) (“Any member of the Commission may be
removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”). The
Court in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States interpreted a statute containing removal
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insulation allows a regulator to do her job concerned with neither her
boss’s policy preferences that run counter to her regulatory mission
nor the regulated industry’s economic motivations.16 The neutral
actor can act neutrally.
Executive appointments and removal restrictions are firmly
entrenched in the constitutional landscape. So too are the procedures
by which they come into being. Administrations accomplish most of
their executive appointments without major controversy.17 While
removal restrictions are perhaps more constitutionally suspect,18 courts
have validated many currently in existence.19
But there are certainly wrong ways to appoint20 and wrong ways to
insulate.21 In these instances, there is a constitutional defect—an
imbalance in the government’s separation of powers.22 An appointment defect fails to lawfully confer executive power on the appointee,
and a removal defect precludes the President from lawfully supervising
another officer’s use of executive power. In both situations, plaintiffs
injured by that power can attack the office’s unconstitutional structure.
This attack is rather straightforward for improper appointments

restrictions to limit the removal power to those enumerated circumstances. See 295 U.S.
602, 626 (1935).
16 See Michael R. Keefe, Note, The Constitutionality of the Double For-Cause Removal
Restriction: Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d
667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1653, 1681 (2009) (“[O]fficers Congress protects
with a for-cause removal restriction generally do act independently, and often against the
president’s interest and the interests of the industries they regulate.”).
17 Presidents must fill roughly 4000 politically appointed positions in the executive
branch, more than 1200 of which require Senate confirmation. Zach Piaker, Help Wanted:
4,000 Presidential Appointees, CTR. FOR PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITION: CTR. BLOG (Mar. 16,
2016),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170112205457/http:/presidentialtransition.org
/blog/posts/160316_help-wanted-4000-appointees.php [https://perma.cc/H6UB-2D26].
Acrimonious confirmation proceedings are the exception.
18 See TODD GARVEY & DANIEL J. SHEFFNER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45442, CONGRESS’S
AUTHORITY TO INFLUENCE AND CONTROL EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES 6–9 (2021).
19 See id.
20 See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–56 (2018) (stating that SEC staff were
not “head[s] of department[s]” and therefore could not lawfully appoint administrative law
judges, whom the Court ruled were “Officers of the United States” (citing U.S. CONST. art
II, § 2, cl. 2)).
21 See, e.g., Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 (2020)
(holding the CFPB Director’s tenure protection unconstitutional because it vested too
much executive authority in a single individual).
22 See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1795–96 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in
part) (explaining that the separation of powers is implicated whether an official is
unconstitutionally appointed or unconstitutionally insulated from removal).
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because there is a neutral, textually grounded standard by which to
judge any given appointment: the Appointments Clause.23
Removal presents a different problem. Save for impeachment,
the Constitution does not specify the procedures by which the
President or anyone else may remove executive officials.24 But the
Constitution’s history, structure, and subsequent interpretation have
established a framework for executive removal procedures.
From the Constitution’s earliest days, politicians, scholars, and
Justices have debated the presidential removal power. For more than
a month at the first Congress, the Representatives discussed the issue.25
Ultimately, in what came to be known as the “Decision of 1789,” the
first Congress (after considering several alternatives) concluded that
the Constitution itself26 conferred upon the President the power to
remove executive officers.27 The Decision “provides ‘contemporaneous and weighty evidence’ of the Constitution’s meaning since many
of the Members of the First Congress ‘had taken part in framing that
instrument.’”28 And it shortly came to be the “settled and well
understood construction of the Constitution” regarding the
presidential removal power.29
The 1926 case Myers v. United States,30 in a “carefully researched
and reasoned 70-page opinion,”31 solidified this understanding.
23 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
24 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 516 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“[W]ith the exception of the general ‘vesting’ and ‘take care’ language, the
Constitution is completely ‘silent with respect to the power of removal from office.’”
(quoting Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839))).
25 Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1023
(2006).
26 Id. at 1022–23. Whether that power’s constitutional source is the Executive Vesting
Clause, the Take Care Clause, the Appointments Clause, or something else is a question
beyond the scope of this Note.
27 Id. at 1023; see also 5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 200
(Philadelphia, C.P. Wayne 1807) (claiming that the Decision of 1789 “has ever been
considered as a full expression of the sense of the legislature” that the Constitution granted
the President full removal authority). Much more has been said about the circumstances
surrounding the Decision. See generally Prakash, supra note 25. And the idea that the
Decision has come to stand for constitutionally granted presidential removal authority is
not unanimously accepted. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 286 n.75 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (concluding that the First Congress’s removal debate’s history is
inconclusive); 1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 332 (Richard Loss ed., 1981) (asserting
that less than a third of the House favored a constitutional removal power).
28 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723–24 (1986) (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783, 790 (1983)).
29 Ex parte Hennen, 38 U.S. at 259.
30 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
31 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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There, the Court held that the Tenure of Office Act of 1876—which
barred the President from firing executive officials without the
Senate’s advice and consent32—was unconstitutional.33 That Act
deprived the President of “the unrestricted power of removal of first
class postmasters.”34 The Court held, echoing James Madison at the
First Congress, that “the power of removal of executive officers was
incident to the power of appointment.”35 Therefore, Congress’s
statutory restriction on the President’s ability to remove the
postmaster—an executive officer—unlawfully impeded the President’s
exercise of the executive power.
Less than a decade after Myers, the Court decided Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States.36 In that case, the Court permitted removal
restrictions on Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC)—without contradicting Myers—because the FTC was a
multimember Commission that wielded “quasi-legislative” and “quasijudicial” powers.37 Accordingly, the Commissioners were not purely
“executive” officials and were beyond the scope of the President’s
unimpeded removal power.38
The Court has walked back Humphrey’s Executor in the years since
that decision. As the Court’s precedent currently stands, principal
officers singly directing executive agencies may almost never have
tenure protection.39
Courts evaluate removal restrictions on
32 Myers, 272 U.S. at 107–08.
33 Id. at 176.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 111–19.
36 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
37 Id. at 629.
38 Id. at 630–31.
39 Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1787 (2021) (“[T]he Constitution prohibits even
‘modest restrictions’ on the President’s power to remove the head of an agency with a single
top officer.” (quoting Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2205
(2020))). After Collins, the Social Security Administration was among the few remaining
executive agencies with a tenure-protected single top officer. This structure did not last
long. See Constitutionality of the Comm’r of Social Sec.’s Tenure Prot., 45 Op. O.L.C., slip
op. at 6 (July 8, 2021) [hereinafter Constitutionality] (advising the President to disregard
the removal restriction on the Commissioner of Social Security); Myah Ward, Biden Fires
Social Security Commissioner, a Trump Holdover, POLITICO, (July 9, 2021), https://www
.politico.com/news/2021/07/09/biden-fires-social-security-commissioner-499009
[https://perma.cc/CX3R-L4MR] (explaining that President Biden fired the Commissioner
of Social Security, removal restriction notwithstanding). In its opinion, however, the Office
of Legal Counsel (echoing the Supreme Court) explicitly left open the possibility that
certain single heads of agencies may have removal restrictions in limited situations. See
Constitutionality, supra, at 10. Its decision on the Commissioner of Social Security did not
address “the head of any other agency that does not share the SSA’s specific combination
of features.” Id. at 10 n.3.
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commissions of multiple principal officers, and all inferior officers,
functionally after considering a host of factors.40 The remedial
problems attendant to removal restrictions are applicable to both sets
of officers.
The constitutional ground on which removal restrictions stand is
shaky at best.41 But the functional nature of the inquiry into their
constitutionality indicates that the Court will eschew a categorical
decision, at least for the foreseeable future. For as long as tenure
protections are part of our constitutional landscape, plaintiffs will find
ways to challenge them. If successful, those plaintiffs should be
entitled to relief. The following cases demonstrate, however, that such
relief is far from certain.
II.

FREE ENTERPRISE FUND AND SEILA LAW

To properly understand the Court’s current remedial quandary,
it is helpful to appreciate the steps it took to get here. To that end, I
discuss two of the Court’s most recent removal power cases.
First, in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board,42 the Court addressed the constitutionality of two layers of
removal protection. In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.43 Sarbanes-Oxley created the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (Board), a regulatory entity designed to enforce
compliance with commercial accounting standards.44 Sarbanes-Oxley
empowered the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to
appoint the Board, but only permitted the SEC to fire Board members

40 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 496 (2010)
(determining that, in the case of a multimember Board, the removal restrictions “impair[]”
the President’s “ability to execute the laws—by holding his subordinates accountable for
their conduct”); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 689–93 (1988) (applying a multifactored
analysis to determine whether an inferior officer’s removal restriction impeded “the
President’s exercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty to ‘take
care that the laws be faithfully executed’”). The Morrison Court made clear that the inquiry
is a functional one; it explained that the “analysis contained in our removal cases is designed
not to define rigid categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by
the President.” Id. at 689.
41 See generally Ilan Wurman, The Removal Power: A Critical Guide, 2019–2020 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 157.
42 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
43 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.), invalidated in part by Free
Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
44 Id. § 101, 116 Stat. at 750–53 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7211).
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“for good cause shown.”45 Under a separate statutory scheme, the
President appointed, with the Senate’s advice and consent, SEC
Commissioners for a five-year term.46 This structure thus created two
degrees of “for cause” removal protection separating the Board from
the President.
Sarbanes-Oxley’s enforcement provisions gave the Board
sweeping regulatory authority. They empowered the Board to enforce
several far-reaching federal securities laws as well as the SEC’s rules,
the Board’s own rules, and professional accounting standards.47 The
target of one such enforcement action, a Nevada accounting firm,
challenged the Board’s removal restrictions. The firm argued that two
layers of removal protection separating the Board members from the
President violated the separation of powers.48
A majority of the Supreme Court agreed; the Board’s structure
was unconstitutional.49 In other words, the plaintiffs got the result they
wanted. But they received no remedy for their injury. The Court held
that because “the Board members have been validly appointed by the
full Commission. . . . petitioners are not entitled to broad injunctive
relief against the Board’s continued operations.”50 Instead, the Court
severed the Board’s removal restrictions, thereby prospectively
enabling the SEC to remove Board members at will.51 Of course, this
remedy did not address the accounting firm’s injuries—namely, the
costs of complying with and fighting against the Board’s enforcement
action.52 In fact, the accounting firm received no relief at all. It
recovered neither damages nor attorneys’ fees, despite their

45 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2018), invalidated by Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct.
Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); see also id. § 7217(b)–(c).
46 Id. § 78d(a). The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which created the SEC and
lays out the Commissioners’ terms of service, does not explicitly give the Commissioners
traditional for-cause removal protection. But in Free Enterprise Fund, “[t]he parties agree[d]
that the Commissioners cannot themselves be removed by the President except under the
Humphrey’s Executor standard of ‘inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.’”
Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602,
620 (1935)). The Court “decide[d] the case with that understanding.” Id. Whether that
understanding is correct is a question this Note does not seek to answer.
47 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(1), (c)(4) (2018).
48 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 487.
49 Id. at 492.
50 Id. at 513; cf. United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970, 1988 (2021) (“Because
the source of the constitutional violation is the restraint on the review authority of the
Director, rather than the appointment of APJs by the Secretary, Arthrex is not entitled to a
hearing before a new panel of APJs.” (citing Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055–56 (2018))).
51 Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508.
52 See Barnett, supra note 3, at 485.
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availability.53 Nor, more importantly, did the Court invalidate any of
the Board’s past actions, require a new administrative investigation, or
enjoin the Board from reinvestigating the very firm that successfully
sued them.54 The action the Board took while unlawfully insulated
from removal was, in effect, valid. The only comfort the plaintiffs
could take was that the SEC would lawfully supervise future Board
actions.55
The remedial shortcomings here are significant. For all intents
and purposes, “[t]he new proceedings . . . picked up where the
‘tainted’ proceedings left off,” and the investigation the unlawfully
unsupervised Board initiated could continue.56 This remedial failure
is a problem for three reasons. First, it failed to provide the subject of
unlawfully unsupervised power—the accounting firm—relief.57
Everything the Board did while unlawfully insulated remained in place.
Second, it failed to incentivize future structural challenges.58 Most
plaintiffs, despite their potentially meritorious claims, will be loath to
challenge government structure for a pyrrhic victory.59 And third, it
disincentivized Congress to consider constitutional structure in
crafting agency legislation.60 Why would Congress pay close attention
when drafting removal restrictions if the Court will simply sever the
unconstitutional ones for them?
Next, in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau61 the
statute at issue directed the newly created Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) to implement and enforce a large body of
consumer protection laws. Those laws “ensur[e] that all consumers
have access to markets for consumer financial products and services
and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair,
transparent, and competitive.”62 A lone Director led the CFPB,63 and
the President could remove him only for “inefficiency, neglect of duty,

53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See id. at 519.
56 Id.
57 See id.; see also Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2366 (2020)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Severing and voiding [the
challenged statutory provision] does nothing to address the injury [plaintiffs] claim . . . .”).
58 See Barnett, supra note 3, at 520.
59 See Barr, 140 S. Ct. at 2366 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“What is the point of fighting this long battle, through many years and all the way to the
Supreme Court, if the prize for winning is no relief at all?”).
60 See Barnett, supra note 3, at 520.
61 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
62 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2018).
63 Id. § 5491(b).
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or malfeasance in office.”64 The Director launched several enforcement actions, one of which targeted Seila Law.65
When Seila Law challenged that enforcement action, the Court
held that the Director’s removal restriction was unconstitutional.66
Again, as far as the removal question was concerned, the plaintiff won.
But again, the Court left it empty-handed. Despite Seila Law’s injury,
and despite the decidedly unlawful removal restriction, the Court
severed the removal restriction and remanded for the lower courts to
determine whether a lawfully constituted Director “ratified” the
unlawfully constituted Director’s actions.67 That is, if the former
signed off on the latter’s actions, those actions would be constitutionally valid.
This remedy is both ineffectual and inconsistent with Free
Enterprise Fund. As a practical matter, it fails to make the victorious
plaintiffs whole. As a constitutional matter, ratification does not
transform the nature of the underlying action.68 By the Court’s
reasoning, whether the unconstitutionally insulated Director lawfully
wielded executive power turns on whether an uninsulated Director
ratified that power after the fact. Unlawful executive power wielded at
time zero is still unlawful at time one, regardless of whether any
properly supervised official bottom-lined it. In addition, despite the
invitation,69 the remedy here does not, in any meaningful way, increase
pressure on Congress to take care when crafting removal restrictions.
By severing the removal restriction, just as it did in Free Enterprise Fund,
the Court did Congress’s job itself. Finally, by remanding for a
ratification determination, the Court implied that a remedy would be
available if that ratification had not occurred—a possibility it did not
countenance in Free Enterprise Fund.
As Free Enterprise Fund and Seila Law show, the Court has
inconsistently remedied plaintiffs in removal restriction cases. A
common theme of each case, however, is the remedial inefficacy.
“[W]hen it comes to finding a remedy for the assorted constitutional
problems with our regulatory apparatus,” explains Professor David
Zaring, “the courts have fallen over themselves to assure everyone that

64 Id. § 5491(c)(3).
65 Seila L., 140 S. Ct. at 2193–94.
66 Id. at 2192.
67 See id. at 2211.
68 See id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining
that “the alleged ratification does not cure the constitutional injury”).
69 See id. at 2211 (majority opinion) (clarifying that the Court’s opinion “does not
foreclose Congress from pursuing alternative responses to the problem—for example,
converting the CFPB into a multimember agency”).
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unconstitutional agency powers should continue to be exercised
almost exactly as before.”70 The natural follow-up question is clear:
“[W]hy hold a government program to be unconstitutional if you
aren’t going to do anything about it?”71
Scholars have justified the Court’s doing so by invoking such
values as judicial modesty,72 settled expectations,73 avoiding complete
system failure,74 and just plain impracticability.75 To be sure, these
values serve important ends in the judicial system. But voiding
unconstitutionally insulated officials’ actions implicates none of them
to such an extent as to justify acquiescence once the Court has
identified the unconstitutionality. When the Court most recently did
identify that very unconstitutionality, it again failed to provide the
victorious plaintiffs relief.
III.

COLLINS V. YELLEN

Collins v. Yellen76 centered around the Federal Housing Finance
Agency (FHFA). The FHFA is an independent regulatory body which
oversees government intervention in the mortgage market. Its primary
charges are two companies, the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac).77 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are governmentbacked, for-profit, privately owned companies.78 They buy mortgages
from banks and other lenders, securitize those mortgages, and sell the
new mortgage-backed securities.79 This arrangement increases stability
in the housing market during times of financial stress.80 Lenders know

70 David Zaring, Toward Separation of Powers Realism, 37 YALE J. ON REGUL. 708, 712
(2020).
71 Id. at 713.
72 Id. at 727.
73 Id. at 745.
74 See Nicholas Bagley, Opinion, ‘Most of Government Is Unconstitutional,’ N.Y. TIMES
(June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/opinion/sunday/gundy-unitedstates.html [https://perma.cc/K93M-HU8P] (giving remedial fangs to separation-ofpowers doctrines would “call[] into question the whole project of modern American
governance”).
75 See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 857, 858 (1999) (explaining that “pure constitutional value[s]” cannot be translated
“into a remedial apparatus” without being “corrupted[,] . . . distorted[,] and diluted”).
76 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).
77 See id. at 1770–71.
78 See About Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov
/about-fannie-mae-freddie-mac [https://perma.cc/A79F-ERZY].
79 Id.
80 See Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1770–71.
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that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will guarantee the loans they make,
so the lenders need not hedge their risk of default with higher interest
rates or stricter credit-eligibility requirements.81 This in turn keeps the
market accessible for a wider range of home buyers.
In the leadup to the 2008 financial crisis, lenders began issuing
subprime mortgages.82 A subprime mortgage is, in broad terms, a
mortgage at an increased risk of default.83 Lenders, in an effort to
resecuritize and sell these mortgages as investments, preferred to
conceal the underlying risk using complex financial instruments.84
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased these mortgages and were
therefore on the hook for the risk of default which, by 2008, was high.85
So when the housing bubble burst, the companies suffered
tremendous losses.86 They remained solvent, but many feared the
companies would eventually fail and plunge the mortgage market into
an even steeper downward spiral.87
In response, Congress passed the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (Recovery Act), which created the FHFA.88 The
FHFA has the power to regulate “nearly every aspect of the companies’
management and operations.”89 The Recovery Act gave the FHFA a
single Director with a five-year term whom the President could remove
only “for cause.”90
81 See id.
82 See MARTIN NEIL BAILY, ROBERT E. LITAN & MATTHEW S. JOHNSON, BROOKINGS,
THE ORIGINS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 14 (2008).
83 See id. (explaining that the term “subprime” generally refers to high interest rate
loans made to borrowers with low credit scores).
84 See, e.g., Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO), CORP. FIN. INST., https://corporate
financeinstitute.com/resources/knowledge/trading-investing/collateralized-debtobligation-cdo/ [https://perma.cc/W4AW-ZWZC].
85 See BAILY ET AL., supra note 82, at 22–23 (explaining that Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac together bought between $340 billion and $660 billion in securitized subprime
mortgages from 2002 to 2007).
86 See Jason Thomas, Fannie, Freddie, and the Crisis, NAT’L AFFS., Fall 2013, at 36, 43
(describing Fannie and Freddie’s combined $213 billion in losses between 2008 and 2011).
87 See Alice Gomstyn, Did Market Overreact on Fannie, Freddie?, ABC NEWS (July 14,
2008),
https://abcnews.go.com/Business/PersonalFinance/story?id=5373707&page=1
[https://perma.cc/CT57-M9T4].
88 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, § 1101, 122 Stat.
2654, 2661–63 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511–12).
89 Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1771 (2021); see 12 U.S.C. § 4541(a) (2018)
(requiring FHFA approval of new products); id. § 4513(a)(2)(A) (allowing the FHFA to
reject certain of the companies’ acquisitions and controlling-interest transfers); id. § 4518
(allowing the FHFA to cap the companies’ executive compensation); id. § 4514(a)(2)
(giving the FHFA the authority to require written reports on the companies’ condition or
“any other relevant topics”).
90 12 U.S.C. § 4512(b) (2018).
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The Recovery Act also gave the Department of the Treasury the
authority to buy stock in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,91 which
Treasury exercised shortly after the Recovery Act passed.92 Pursuant to
that authority, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Treasury entered into a
series of share purchase agreements in which Treasury committed to
providing each of the companies with up to $100 billion in capital in
exchange for stock.93 Those agreements were designed to increase the
companies’ cash reserves to stabilize their net worth.94 At first, they
didn’t work. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continued to lose money
despite Treasury’s intervention, so the three of them restructured their
arrangement several times.95 The third such restructuring—the “third
amendment”—required Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pay Treasury
any capital earned in a given quarter above a specified threshold.96
Shortly after the third amendment took effect, the companies’
financial situation improved. Their incomes greatly exceeded the
third amendment’s threshold.97 But the third amendment required
them to transfer that excess income directly to Treasury as opposed to
their net worth (and, therefore, their shareholders).98 A group of
shareholders sued, arguing that the FHFA’s Director had no authority
to enforce the third amendment.99 They argued that, due to his
allegedly unconstitutional removal restriction, he never had any
constitutional power at all.100
Addressing the removal restriction was a relatively simple matter.
The Fifth Circuit held that it violated the separation of powers,101 and
the federal parties did not contest that conclusion at the Supreme
Court.102 Despite briefing and argument on the issue from amicus
Aaron Nielson, the Court agreed that the removal restriction was
unconstitutional.103 The remedy, however, was not as simple.

91 See id. §§ 1455(l)(1), 1719(g)(1).
92 Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1772–73.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 1770.
95 Id. at 1773.
96 Id. at 1773–74.
97 See id. at 1774.
98 See id. (explaining that, under the third amendment, Fannie and Freddie paid $124
billion more than they would have under the pre–third amendment regime).
99 Id. at 1775.
100 See id.
101 Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 587–91 (5th Cir. 2019), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom., Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761 (2021).
102 Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1775.
103 See id. at 1775, 1783.
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“All the officers who headed the FHFA during the time in
question were properly appointed,” explained Justice Alito for the
Court.104
“Although the statute unconstitutionally limited the
President’s authority to remove the confirmed Directors, there was no
constitutional defect in the statutorily prescribed method of
appointment to that office.”105 Therefore, he concluded, “there is no
basis for concluding that any head of the FHFA lacked the authority to
carry out the functions of the office.”106
Everyone agreed that the removal restriction was unlawful. And
the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had suffered an injury.107
Unlawful action plus injury in fact caused by that unlawful action, of
course, likely equals a remedy for the injured party.108 But the Court
remanded the question of remedy back to the Fifth Circuit to
determine whether the removal restriction itself—as opposed to the
Director’s action—injured the plaintiffs. “Were it not for that
provision,” the Court held, “the President might have replaced one of
the confirmed Directors who supervised the implementation of the
third amendment, or a confirmed Director might have altered his
behavior in a way that would have benefitted the shareholders.”109 The
Court directed the lower courts to “resolve[] [these issues] in the first
instance” on remand.110
In doing so, the Court staked out a constitutional no-man’s-land.
After deciding that the Director’s tenure protection was unconstitutional,
it evaluated for constitutionality the Director’s action taken under that
protection. That action was neither constitutional because of his
proper appointment nor unconstitutional because of his unlawful
removal restriction. The question of constitutionality could only be
answered after a search for evidence of the President’s past desire (or
lack thereof) to remove the Director. As a practical matter, this

104 Id. at 1787.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1788.
107 Id. at 1779 (explaining that the plaintiffs successfully alleged “that sort of
pocketbook injury [which] is a prototypical form of injury in fact”).
108 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (noting that if the
plaintiff challenges the legality of government action or inaction and is the object of that
action or inaction, “there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused
him injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it”); see also
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996) (explaining that plaintiffs need “actual or
imminent harm” to “invoke intervention of the courts” and that “merely the status of being
subject to a governmental institution that was not organized or managed properly” is
insufficient to challenge that governmental institution’s actions).
109 Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1789.
110 Id.
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search’s unlikelihood of success leaves the plaintiffs’ injury
unredressed. Moreover, this remedial calculus accepts a line of
argument the Court had already squarely rejected.
In Seila Law, the Court-appointed amicus defending the CFPB
Director’s removal restriction argued that “a litigant wishing to
challenge an executive act on the basis of the President’s removal
power must show that the challenged act would not have been taken if
the responsible official had been subject to the President’s control.”111
This should sound familiar, as it is precisely what the Court ordered
the Collins plaintiffs to prove on remand. But in Seila Law, the Court
explicitly rejected this course of action. It explained that, when
challenging government action as void due to a separation-of-powers
violation (precisely as the Collins plaintiffs did), the plaintiff need not
prove that the government’s action would have been different in a
“counterfactual world.”112 The Court’s reversal on this point is
inexplicable.
The same remedial shortcomings from Free Enterprise Fund and
Seila Law are present here. The shareholders, despite proving that they
were on the receiving end of unconstitutionally unsupervised
governmental action, go unredressed. In addition, the practical effect
of the Court’s remand is to all but stamp the executive overreach taken
pursuant to congressionally granted tenure protection with the judicial
imprimatur. No branch emerges unscathed from this separation-ofpowers morass. Finally, by minimizing the real-world consequences of
the unconstitutional tenure protection (that is, by not setting aside the
Director’s injurious actions), the Court ensures that Congress does not
feel the repercussions of its unconstitutional legislation.
Justice Gorsuch identified a more straightforward solution that
would have alleviated these problems. To him, “[i]t is unclear . . . why
this distinction [between unlawful appointments and unlawful removal
restrictions] should make a difference” for the purpose of crafting a
remedy.113 “Either way,” he continued, “governmental action is taken
by someone erroneously claiming the mantle of executive power.”114
When viewed this way, the remedial question is easier; the official’s
actions lack the force of law—the actor’s power is per se tainted—and
the Court must set them aside. Accordingly, Justice Gorsuch would
have “take[n] a simpler and more familiar path.”115 He would have set
111 Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2195–96 (2020).
112 Id. at 2196 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477,
512 n.12 (2010)).
113 Collins, 141 S. Ct. at 1795 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1799.
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aside the Director’s action as void without remanding for any further
analysis.116
The Justices’ conflicting treatments of the case reveal different
baseline approaches for dealing with an unconstitutional removal
restriction. The majority and Justice Thomas in concurrence apply a
presumption that the official’s action—if not the removal restriction—
is constitutional.117
Justice Thomas argued that, because the Constitution automatically displaces an unconstitutional statute, the unconstitutional
removal restriction was never actually law in the first place. Therefore,
the President really could have fired the Director whenever he wanted;
he just never tried.118 For the plaintiffs to prevail, according to Justice
Thomas, they would need to establish that the Director took some
other unlawful action while unlawfully insulated from removal.119
Professor William Baude recently addressed the Gorsuch/
Thomas split on this question. To him, Justice Thomas has the better
of the argument. “An unconstitutional statute is void,” Professor
Baude explains, because the Constitution (of its own force) displaces
that statute the moment the President signs it.120 Thus, unconstitutional removal restrictions, though they exist as positive enactments,
are utterly without the force of law.121 Therefore, when faced with an
unconstitutional removal restriction, “[n]obody should apply it,
nobody should enforce it, and if nobody does, all is right with the legal
world.”122 On this theory, Justice Thomas’s argument makes perfect
sense. For a judicially cognizable injury to occur, an executive official’s
action taken while protected by an unconstitutional removal
restriction must also violate some other law because that removal
restriction is completely illusory.
As a theoretical matter, this may well be correct. But as a practical
and political matter, it does not solve the remedial problem. Executive
officials, themselves political actors, are incentivized not to question
their tenure protections’ constitutionality: who doesn’t want job
security? Accordingly, that official will behave as if his tenure

116 See id.
117 See id. at 1793 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The mere existence of an
unconstitutional removal provision, too, generally does not automatically taint Government
action by an official unlawfully insulated.”).
118 See id. at 1793–94.
119 Id. at 1795.
120 William Baude, Severability First Principles, 109 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2023)
(manuscript at 33–38), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4064156.
121 See id. (manuscript at 37).
122 Id. (footnote omitted).
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protection is fully effective, despite the fact that perhaps as a
constitutional matter it has no effect at all. By the time a court can
issue a judgment saying as much, it will be too late for the injured
plaintiffs. Politically, a President will likely hesitate to risk an acrimonious confrontation by firing a purportedly tenure-protected official
without a court-issued judgment in hand.123 It is not enough to simply
say that the removal restriction never had any legal force. The relevant
constitutional actors caused real-world harm.
If the Court’s goal is to remedy unconstitutionally unsupervised
government action, it must account for these practical and political
realities. So while Professor Baude’s argument is theoretically compelling, the remedial discussion demands a more accommodating
approach in practice.124
The Collins majority’s approach is similar to the one the Court
took in Seila Law. Instead of ratification, however, the lower courts
were tasked with identifying proof that the President would have fired
the Director but for the removal restriction. I call this “the
presumption of constitutionality” or the “case-by-case” approach, as it
requires a case-by-case inquiry beyond simply whether the removal
restriction was constitutional.
Another approach, as Justice Gorsuch identified, is to hold that
unlawful removal restrictions per se taint executive action. Because
the removal restriction unconstitutionally taints the actor’s office, that
actor’s power is simply invalid ab initio. Therefore, when it is
injuriously wielded, the Court must set its effects aside in a per se
fashion. I call this the “per se” approach.
IV.

THE BENEFITS OF THE PER SE APPROACH

In light of the inconsistent and ineffectual remedies in past
removal restriction cases, courts should apply Justice Gorsuch’s per se
approach. Doing so serves two similar but distinct goals, from both of
which the case-by-case approach derogates. First, it would better align
remedies in removal restriction cases with the Court’s remedial
practice in other structural power violations. Plaintiffs who successfully
challenge the use of unlawfully unsupervised or improperly constituted government power against them will be consistently and

123 But see supra note 39. This assertion carries less weight when the President and the
official are on opposite political sides.
124 Cf. Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 322
(1999) (“We do not question the proposition that equity is flexible; but in the federal
system, at least, that flexibility is confined within the broad boundaries of traditional
equitable relief.”).
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predictably made whole. And second, it would solve the remedial
shortcomings that have become the hallmark of the Court’s removal
restriction doctrine.
A. Unifying Remedies Across the Constitutional Landscape
Adopting the per se remedial approach to unconstitutional
removal restrictions would introduce consistency to the Court’s
treatments of defective government power. In each branch of
government—including the executive—the Court has adopted a per
se approach when constitutional actors exercise flawed government
power. Whether that power is unlawfully unsupervised as in the Article
I context, or the body exercising it is unlawfully constituted as in the
Article II and Article III contexts, the Court has not countenanced a
retrospective, counterfactual inquiry of the type it has in removal
restriction cases. It has invalidated the flawed proceedings in a per se
fashion. Applying the same per se approach to removal restrictions
would conform the removal doctrine to these analogous situations.
1. Unconstitutional Article I Courts
The 2011 case Stern v. Marshall125 provides an example of how the
Court has addressed the unconstitutionally unsupervised exercise of
government power. That case concerned the late J. Howard Marshall
II’s estate. Marshall was thought to be “one of the richest people in
Texas,” and his survivors’ battle over his fortune was protracted,
acrimonious, and involved multiple trips to every level of the federal
judiciary.126 Before reaching the Article III courts, however, the
Bankruptcy Court resolved many of the survivors’ competing claims. A
brief introduction to the Bankruptcy Court is in order.
The Bankruptcy Court is a statutorily created tribunal to which
federal district courts may refer certain matters pertaining to,
unsurprisingly, bankruptcy.127 Congress explicitly outlined the matters
the Bankruptcy Court may resolve with finality.128 One of those sets of
matters concerns “core proceedings arising under title 11.”129 Core
proceedings include, as relevant in Stern, “counterclaims by [a
debtor’s] estate against persons filing claims against the estate.”130 In
cases that are not core proceedings but are “otherwise related to a case
125
126
127
128
129
130

564 U.S. 462 (2011).
Id. at 468.
28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157(a) (2018).
Id. § 157(b)(1)–(2).
Id. § 157(b)(1).
Id. § 157(b)(2)(C).
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under title 11,” the judge may only “submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court.”131
The questions in this case were whether the Bankruptcy Court had
both the statutory and constitutional authority to hear a survivor’s
counterclaim—a “core proceeding.” To the statutory question, the
Court answered yes.132 But to the constitutional question, it answered
no.133
The Court first discussed the importance of giving effect to
separation-of-powers principles.134 It is true that “the three branches
are not hermetically sealed from one another,”135 but it is equally true
that the Constitution “imposes some basic limitations that the other
branches may not transgress.”136 In this case, Congress transgressed
the limits of its power. By vesting the Bankruptcy Court with the power
to decide debtors’ suits in bankruptcy proceedings, Congress granted
the judicial power to an actor other than an Article III judge in an
Article III court.137 Having identified the constitutional defect, the
only remaining question was the remedy.
The remedial question for the Court was straightforward.
Answering it required only that it affirm the Ninth Circuit’s judgment,
which held the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling void on procedural vice
constitutional grounds.138 Different means, same end; the Supreme
Court identified a constitutional defect in the Bankruptcy Court’s
power which nullified the subsequent exercise of that power.
In one sense, the Court’s conclusion was expressly a “narrow”
one.139 The Bankruptcy Court, because it is not an Article III court,
may not decide questions of law traditionally decided by Article III
courts. Without Article III review, the Bankruptcy Court was wielding
government power in an unconstitutionally unsupervised manner.
The Court highlighted this point when it declared that “[a] statute may
no more lawfully chip away at the authority of the Judicial Branch than
it may eliminate it entirely.”140 More generally, unless the power vested
in a constitutional actor is fully intact, that power is ineffectual. There

131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

Id. § 157(c)(1).
See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 475–78 (2011).
Id. at 482.
See id. at 482–84.
Id. at 483 (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)).
Id.
See id. at 503.
See Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1060 (9th Cir. 2010).
Stern, 564 U.S. at 502.
Id. at 502–03.
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is, after all, no such thing as “mostly constitutional” government
power. Without proper supervision, that power is not fully intact.141
The problem with the Bankruptcy Court’s power was ultimately
one of supervision. It exercised the Article III judicial power without
any accountability to an Article III actor. When it did so and inflicted
a legal harm on an individual, the Court set the proceeding aside as
void. The Court did not remand for lower courts to determine
whether an Article III court would have come to the same conclusion
in a counterfactual world. All the same in the removal context.
Executive officials with unconstitutional removal restrictions are free
from supervision of, and lack accountability to, an Article II actor.
Apart from a lack of supervision, one may also consider an
unlawfully unsupervised executive actor’s office as being altogether
unconstitutionally structured. In this sense, the problem is not
necessarily a lack of supervision but a defect in the office itself.142 In
cases dealing with such offices in the Article II context, the Court has
applied a per se remedial approach.
2. Unconstitutional Article II Appointments
Recall that in Collins, the Court held that because the Director was
appointed properly, his power was valid, unconstitutional removal
restriction notwithstanding.143 Justice Gorsuch, in his Collins partial
concurrence, identified the incongruity in that statement. “Whether
unconstitutionally installed or improperly unsupervised,” he
explained, “officials cannot wield executive power except as Article II
provides.”144 And, he continued, the Court’s “novel and feeble”
remedy drew a distinction between appointment and removal
supported by “not a single precedent in 230 years.”145 In fact, the
141 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(plurality opinion) (holding that a statute unconstitutionally removed “most, if not all, of
‘the essential attributes of the judicial power’ from . . . Art. III courts” (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932))).
142 An analogy may be helpful here: Imagine an electrical circuit. For the circuit’s
load, say, a light bulb, to have power, the circuit must be fully intact. If any portion of the
circuit is open, the light bulb will not illuminate; current will not reach it. We can think of
government offices in the same way. In order for the bulb to light—for the office to have
power—the entire “circuit” must be intact. That means the official must be appointed
properly, must be acting within his statutory authority, and must be subject to
constitutionally proper supervision. If any of these attributes is lacking, the bulb will not
light, so to speak, and the official’s office is improperly constituted.
143 See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
144 Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1799 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
145 See id. at 1795–97; see also id. at 1799 (“[T]he Court has in the past consistently
vindicated Article II both in reasoning and in remedy.”).
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Court’s precedents cut in the opposite direction. The principles
underlying the remedies in Appointments Clause cases are no less
applicable to removal cases, as a brief look at those cases shows.
Perhaps because the Appointments Clause is itself an explicit
constitutional requirement, the Court has endorsed an explicit
remedial approach in unconstitutional appointment cases.146 In Ryder
v. United States, a unanimous Court held that “one who makes a timely
challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer
who adjudicates his case is entitled to a decision on the merits . . . and
whatever relief may be appropriate if a violation indeed occurred.”147
To adopt any other approach, the Court continued, “would create a
disincentive to raise Appointments Clause challenges with respect to
questionable judicial appointments.”148 From Ryder, a couple of things
are clear: First, the remedial decision begins and ends with the validity
of the officer’s appointment. The Court did not contemplate an
inquiry into whether, absent the appointment defect, the plaintiffs
would have wound up injured anyway. And second, the Court is
interested in encouraging, or at least not discouraging, separation-ofpowers challenges.
These principles were broadened and strengthened in Lucia v.
Securities and Exchange Commission.149 There, quoting Ryder, the Court
held that a successful plaintiff in an Appointments Clause case “is
entitled to relief.”150 This language is more categorical than Ryder’s.
And, as did the Ryder Court, the Lucia Court explained that
Appointments Clause remedies are designed to encourage

146 One possible variant is Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). There,
the Court “accorded de facto validity” to actions that the Federal Election Commission took
while the Commissioners were in power pursuant to an unconstitutional appointment. Id.
at 142. But Buckley is not representative of most Appointments Clause cases. At the district
court in Buckley, the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment holding that certain campaign
finance laws were unconstitutional as well as an injunction against future enforcement of
those laws. Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 137 (D.D.C. 1975). The plaintiffs did not
ask the court to set aside any specific enforcement action. Declaratory judgments and
injunctions are, by their nature, prospective only. And because “parties with sufficient
concrete interests at stake have been held to have standing to raise constitutional questions
of separation of powers with respect to an agency designated to adjudicate their rights,” the
case presented a justiciable question for the Court to answer without needing to redress any
past injury. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 12 n.10. So based on the unique posture of the Buckley
plaintiffs, the Court could not have employed a per se remedial approach even if it wanted
to. There was no specific agency action to set aside in a per se fashion.
147 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995).
148 Id. at 183.
149 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
150 Id. at 2055 (citing Ryder, 515 U.S at 182–83).
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Appointments Clause challenges.151 They do so by directly advancing
the Appointments Clause’s structural purposes.152 Those purposes,
drawn from Freytag v. Commissioner as cited by Justice Breyer,153 include
“guard[ing] against [the] encroachment” on one branch’s power by
another, “preventing the diffusion of the appointment power,” and,
more generally, “preserv[ing] . . . the Constitution’s structural
integrity.”154 Lucia, therefore, solidifies the idea that plaintiffs who
successfully prove that an appointment is unconstitutional are per se
entitled to relief. It also affirms the notion that remedies in separationof-powers cases should be fashioned to reinforce separation-of-powers
norms.
The principles underlying the remedial strategy in Appointments
Clause cases apply equally to removal cases. A defective appointment
taints an executive official’s office; power wielded pursuant to an
unconstitutional appointment is invalid and the effects of its exercise,
when challenged, are categorically set aside. An official who is lawfully
appointed but unlawfully free from supervision possesses similarly
flawed executive power; the flaw is simply on the back end instead of
the front.
Indeed, “removal restrictions may be a greater
constitutional evil than appointment defects.”155 Once an executive
official has gained his office, “it is only the authority that can remove
him, and not the authority that appointed him, that he must fear.”156
Wielding lawfully conferred government power without supervision is
thus no more constitutionally valid—and more constitutionally
problematic—than wielding unlawfully conferred but properly
supervised government power.
Beyond the Appointments Clause itself, the Court’s treatment of
other appointment defects is consistent. In National Labor Relations
Board v. Noel Canning,157 the Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s holding
that the Board’s action was void when the Board was unlawfully
constituted.158 The President appointed three of the NLRB’s five

151 Id. at 2055 n.5.
152 Id. (explaining that “[the Court’s] Appointments Clause remedies are designed . . .
to advance those purposes directly”).
153 See id. at 2064 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).
154 Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878.
155 Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1796 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part).
156 Id. (quoting Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1401 (D.D.C. 1986) (per
curiam)).
157 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
158 Id. at 557; see Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 513–14 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d,
573 U.S. 513 (2014).
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Board members pursuant to the Recess Appointments Clause.159 But
because the Senate was not actually in recess when the President made
the appointments, those appointments were invalid.160 Therefore, the
Board lacked a quorum, and its order lacked the force of law.161
The Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s remedial judgment, and the
D.C. Circuit did not equivocate in its remedial tone. Nor did the D.C.
Circuit tie the remedy directly to the appointment defects. It
concluded that “none of the three appointments” made during what
the President thought was a recess was valid.162 But that alone did not
invalidate the Board’s decision. The result of those unlawful
appointments was that “the Board lacked a quorum.”163 That was why its
decision was vacated. The problem was not with the unconstitutional
appointments themselves; the problem was that those appointments
rendered the Board’s structure unconstitutional, and an
unconstitutionally structured Board’s decision “must be vacated.”164
In the same way that unlawful appointments invalidated the Board’s
action by tainting its underlying structure, an unlawful removal
restriction introduces a flaw into the actor’s office. The flaw is simply
a lack of supervision of lawfully transferred power as opposed to a
properly supervised but unlawful transfer of power.
3. Unconstitutionally Structured Article III Courts
Judicial disqualification is a doctrine rooted in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In judicial disqualification cases,
“the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes a
constitutional floor” and “clearly requires a ‘fair trial in a fair
tribunal.’”165 The Supreme Court has repeatedly required reviewing
courts to set aside lower court judgments when that lower court, for
whatever reason, was improperly structured.
Courts can be improperly constituted in a number of ways. For
example, the deciding vote in the lower court’s decision might have a

159 Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 520; U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 3.
160 Noel Canning, 573 U.S. at 550.
161 Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 513–14.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 514 (emphasis added).
164 Id.; cf. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 879 (1991) (“The alleged defect in the
appointment of the Special Trial Judge goes to the validity of the Tax Court proceeding
that is the basis for this litigation.”).
165 Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35, 46 (1975)).
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personal financial stake in the outcome.166 Or the reviewing court may
have a member with too close a connection to the proceedings
below.167 Either way, the results of the unlawfully constituted court’s
decisions are void.
An early disqualification case highlights the point. In William
Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Building Co. v. International Curtiss Marine
Turbine Co.,168 a district court judge entered a pro forma decree to allow
the Third Circuit to hear the case on the merits in the first instance.169
When the Third Circuit heard the case, the very same judge that
presided over the trial below sat on the reviewing panel.170 The
situation’s impropriety is obvious enough, but there was a wrinkle: the
parties agreed that this arrangement was not a problem.171 And
because the offending judge only issued a pro forma decree, he did
not “express an opinion on the case in the first instance.”172 To put it
in Collins terms, the litigants here did the counterfactual analysis
themselves.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the judge’s participation on the
panel was unlawful. Specifically, it violated Section 120 of the Judicial
Code.173 That section provided that “no judge before whom a cause or
question may have been . . . heard in a district court . . . shall sit on the
trial or hearing of such cause or question in the circuit court of
appeals.”174 The parties’ consent and the procedural posture were
immaterial; the judge’s judicial power was tainted by his statutory
violation. The statutory taint rendered the appellate panel “a court
organized[] not in conformity to law.”175 As a result, the Court “at
once reverse[d] and remand[ed] to the court below so that the case
may be heard by a competent court” whose power could be lawfully
wielded.176
Nowhere did the Court entertain a counterfactual inquiry into
whether a properly constituted lower court would have arrived at the
166 See Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822–25 (1986); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S.
510, 523–25 (1927). In each of these cases, the Court did not hesitate to invalidate the
improperly constituted court’s decisions and remand for new proceedings before a lawfully
structured court.
167 See infra notes 168–81 and accompanying text.
168 228 U.S. 645 (1913).
169 Id. at 645–48.
170 Id. at 648.
171 Id. at 650.
172 Id. at 649.
173 Id. at 649–50.
174 Judicial Code, ch. 231, § 120, 36 Stat. 1087, 1132 (1911).
175 William Cramp & Sons, 228 U.S. at 650.
176 Id. at 651.
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same conclusion. Indeed, the Court expressly rejected that line of
inquiry in a later judicial disqualification case. In Nguyen v. United
States,177 the Chief Judge of the District Court for the Northern Mariana
Islands—an Article IV territorial court—sat on a three-judge Ninth
Circuit panel with two Article III judges.178 Neither party objected to
this “highly unusual” panel composition.179 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court vacated the panel’s judgment and remanded for another
hearing.180
Its reasoning is instructive. “Even if the parties had expressly
stipulated to the participation of a non-Article III judge in the
consideration of their appeals,” the Court explained, “such a
stipulation would not have cured the plain defect in the composition
of the panel.”181 In other words, there was no action the parties could
have taken that would have excused the panel’s unconstitutionality.
So, naturally, the Court felt no need to order a retrospective inquiry
into whether a properly constituted panel would have ruled the same
way as the improperly constituted panel. In the judicial context,
government power wielded by an improperly constituted government
actor is simply void.
Judicial disqualification cases and removal restriction cases
present the same problem. In both situations, a government actor with
the power to define private citizens’ legal obligations is unlawfully
structured. In judicial disqualification cases, that fact has been
sufficient to taint the entire proceeding. The Court’s remedies have
paid no mind to parties’ agreements that the disqualified judge did not
render the proceedings invalid. If the Court is willing to set aside the
judgments of courts improperly wielding government power, there is
no reason that it shouldn’t do the same for executive actors.
As the cases above show, the Court is willing to invalidate judicial
action when it stems from an unlawfully structured court.182 The courts
had jurisdiction and the cases were justiciable, but the improperly
177 539 U.S. 69 (2003).
178 Id. at 72–73.
179 Id. at 73.
180 Id. at 83.
181 Id. at 80–81 (citing William Cramp & Sons, 228 U.S. at 650).
182 The cases discussed above are demonstrative, but not exclusive, in supporting this
proposition. See, e.g., Moran v. Dillingham, 174 U.S. 153, 153, 158 (1899) (decision made
by improperly constituted lower court “must certainly be set aside and quashed, without
regard to its merits” and remanded to be “heard and determined according to law by a
bench of competent judges” (emphasis omitted)); Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa
& Key W. Ry., 148 U.S. 372, 387 (1893) (explaining that a proceeding below with an
improperly sitting judge “was unlawful, and perhaps absolutely void, and should certainly
be set aside or quashed by any court having authority to review it”).
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exercised judicial power tainted the proceedings. Invalidating
unlawfully structured executive action due to a removal defect,
therefore, is an a fortiori case. The executive is limited only by the
Constitution itself and congressional grants of authority.183 And the
current state of the nondelegation doctrine184 incentivizes Congress to
continue granting the executive significant authority. If the judiciary
“may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely
judgment,”185 and the Court rigorously enforces against the judiciary
the requirements for exercising government power, it should be all the
more inclined to enforce those requirements against “the sword of the
community.”186
B. Alleviating the Problems with Presuming Constitutionality
The proceedings in each of the three categories above can be
characterized in two ways. One is to say that the proceedings were
flawed due to a lack of supervision from a constitutional actor. The
Bankruptcy Court exercised the judicial power free from supervision
by an Article III actor. As such, that power was void. Another is to
characterize the flaw as a defect in the office’s structure. Improper
appointments or improperly seated judges taint the government
actor’s makeup such that the office lacks constitutional power
altogether. Each characterization leads to the same result. The
government actor’s power is flawed, and the results of that power’s use
are per se void and vacated.
Whether we consider unconstitutional removal restrictions a
failure of supervision, a failure of structure, or both, yet unanswered is
the following question: despite the consistency it would introduce,
should the Court redress removal restrictions in the same way it
redresses other separation-of-powers problems? After all, not every
constitutional doctrine lends itself to a formal remedial structure.187

183 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (contrasting legislative action,
which requires strict adherence to Article I’s procedures, and executive action, which is not
subject to any procedural review because “the Constitution does not so require”).
184 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131–42 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (describing the Court’s nearly nonexistent standard for enforcing the
nondelegation doctrine as “delegation running riot” (quoting A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring))).
185 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphasis omitted).
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 392–97 (1971) (providing a freestanding federal cause of action when the
government violates the Constitution as to a particular plaintiff). Scholars have criticized
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But recall the three main remedial failures in the case-by-case
approach, as seen in Free Enterprise Fund, Seila Law, and Collins. Each
is alleviated by applying the per se approach.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the per se approach would
consistently and predictably redresses the actual target of removalrestricted executive action. Noble as the cause may be, a victory is of
little practical consequence for a successful plaintiff if the Court only
prospectively invalidates the official’s tenure protection, as it did in
Free Enterprise Fund. In addition, it is little more than a token victory
when, as it did in Seila Law and Collins, the Court conditions recovery
on proving an exceedingly unlikely retrospective hypothetical.188
Looming large in the remedial debate is the question whether
individuals have a freestanding right to injunctive relief against
unlawful government action against them. The Supreme Court has
indicated that individuals do possess this right, provided they meet
Article III’s other requirements (e.g., standing). If that is indeed the
case, courts need not require an additional showing beyond the fact
that the adversarial government actor injured the plaintiff while
unlawfully insulated from removal.189 By requiring something more,
the case-by-case approach prioritizes minimizing the decision’s
the Bivens line of cases for its malleability. See Gene R. Nichol, Bivens, Chilicky, and
Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (1989) (“The doctrinal tensions
and inconsistencies that the [Bivens] cases reveal are overt, not latent; direct, not inferential;
and fundamental, not peripheral.”). In addition, the Court in recent years has significantly
backtracked on Bivens actions’ availability. See Cassandra Robertson, SCOTUS Sharply Limits
Bivens Claims—and Hints at Further Retrenchment, A.B.A. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/civil-rights/practice/2020/scotussharply-limits-bivens-claims-and-hints-at-further-retrenchment/ [https://perma.cc/VLL59KX7].
188 See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1799 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part)
(“It’s hard not to wonder whether . . . [the Court] intends for this speculative enterprise to
go nowhere. Rather than intrude on often-privileged executive deliberations, the Court
may calculate that the lower courts on remand in this suit will simply refuse retroactive
relief. . . . But if this is what the Court intends, why not just admit it and put these parties
out of their misery?” (citing id. at 1802 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment in part))).
189 The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have even suggested that being
subject to unconstitutional government authority is itself a judicially cognizable injury. See
Seila L. LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020) (“[W]hen [a
tenure protection] provision violates the separation of powers it inflicts a ‘here-and-now’
injury on affected third parties that can be remedied by a court.” (quoting Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 (1986))); Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 986 F.3d 1173, 1195–96 (9th Cir.
2021) (Bumatay, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[A]
government agency inflicts injury on a person whenever it subjects that person to
unconstitutional authority . . . .”), cert. granted in part, Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 142 S. Ct.
895 (2022) (mem.).
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implications as opposed to redressing the plaintiffs’ injuries. The per
se approach realigns those priorities.
In addition, the per se approach’s consistency would encourage
litigants to challenge potentially unconstitutional removal restrictions.
Additional encouragement of this nature is important because the
average litigant will probably not be concerned with the big picture
structural questions arising from his lawsuit. Most plaintiffs, explains
Professor Barnett, “may care only marginally . . . about the boundaries
of administrative structures or these structures’ effect on constitutional
or administrative law theory.”190 Therefore, to the extent the assurance
of a meaningful remedy encourages a potentially meritorious plaintiff
to sue, it collaterally helps to alleviate the second remedial failure: the
blurring of the separation of powers.
The per se approach would encourage the Court to enforce the
separation of powers. To understand why, consider the alternative. By
presuming the constitutionality of unlawfully tenure-protected
executive action, the Court implicates the separation of powers in all
three branches. First, it stamps tentative approval on the exercise of
unlawful executive power. Second, it fails to address a decidedly
unconstitutional statutory provision. Severability—the Court’s preferred answer to this problem—is no more permissible as a separationof-powers matter than simply leaving the unconstitutional removal
restriction in place. And third, it minimizes the Court’s role in
addressing unconstitutionality when it sees it.
Start with the executive. By leaving in place (pending additional
proceedings on remand) action taken under the cover of an unlawful
removal restriction, the Court encourages misdirected accountability
for that action. Removal restrictions diffuse accountability.191 When
an unlawfully insulated official acts, he does so free from the political
repercussions normally attendant to the executive.192 And officials
accountable neither to the President nor to the electorate “pose a
significant threat to individual liberty and to the constitutional system
of separation of powers and checks and balances.”193 Therefore, to
prevent “diminish[ing] the intended and necessary responsibility of
the [c]hief [m]agistrate himself,”194 the Court should, in a per se
190 Barnett, supra note 3, at 496.
191 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010) (“The
diffusion of power carries with it a diffusion of accountability.”).
192 See id. at 497–98 (“The people do not vote for the ‘Officers of the United States.’”
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2)).
193 PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
194 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 429 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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fashion, set aside actions taken by officials unconstitutionally shielded
from accountability.
The legislative branch fares no better in a separation-of-powers
analysis under the case-by-case approach. When Congress allows the
Court to surgically excise195 unconstitutional removal restrictions by
invoking the severability doctrine, as it did in Seila Law, it abdicates its
legislative power.196 One can see this approach’s appeal, from both the
Congress’s and the Court’s perspective. Congress need not pay close
attention when drafting removal restrictions because the Court will
simply “rewrite the law” for them.197 In addition, when the Court holds
removal restrictions unconstitutional, it acts as a convenient political
scapegoat for the Congress that drafted them.
From the Court’s perspective, it need not worry about the big
picture implications of holding a removal restriction unconstitutional.198 Rather than require the legislative process to produce a
constitutional statute, the Court can order enforcement of everything
except the unconstitutional provision, thereby minimizing the shock
to the governmental system.199 The practical effect, however, is a new
statute—one that neither passed both Houses of Congress nor received
the President’s signature.200
Finally, the case-by-case approach minimizes the judiciary’s role in
policing the separation of powers. Generally, the remedies litigants

195 Of course, neither the Supreme Court nor any federal court actually excises
anything. See Jonathan F. Mitchell, The Writ-of-Erasure Fallacy, 104 VA. L. REV. 933, 936
(2018) (“The federal courts have no authority to erase a duly enacted law from the statute
books, and they have no power to veto or suspend a statute.”). Severability refers to the
practice of declining to order enforcement of specific statutory provisions rather than allow
the offending provision to render the entire law unenforceable.
196 For a thorough (and critical) discussion of severability doctrine, see generally John
Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203 (1993).
197 See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2365 (2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
198 See Jonathan H. Adler, Supreme Court Reaffirms Traditional Severability Principles in
Barr v. AAPC, REASON: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 6, 2020, 11:07 PM), https://reason.com
/volokh/2020/07/06/supreme-court-reaffirms-traditional-severability-principles-in-barr-vaapc/ [https://perma.cc/BB9L-VCFH].
199 But see Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1986) (explaining that the “fact that a
given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution” (quoting
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983))).
200 See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439–40 (1998) (“[T]he power to enact
statutes may only ‘be exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedure.’” (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951)); see also Tom Campbell,
Severability of Statutes, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1495, 1498–505 (2011).
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seek and courts award drive substantive norms.201 In particular,
structural remedies seek to drive substantive separation-of-powers
norms. “Structure is destiny,”202 and the separation of powers is how
we avoid “[t]he accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands,”
which “may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”203
Structural separation-of-powers principles are not necessarily selfexecuting;204 the courts are the prime movers in constitutional line
drawing.205 It is therefore consistent with the judicial role to police the
boundaries of power among the branches of government. Identifying
unconstitutionality, however, is only step one; the next step is doing
something about it. The Court should give full effect to its findings of
unconstitutionality by properly redressing the action taken pursuant
to that unconstitutionality. To do otherwise is to avoid “say[ing] what
the law is,”206 and redressing removal restriction violations is in keeping

201 Barnett, supra note 3, at 496 (“[I]t is all but meaningless to consider one without
the other.”).
202 Justices Scalia and Ginsburg on the First Amendment and Freedom, C-SPAN (Apr. 17,
2014) (Justice Scalia speaking in interview), https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4717289
/user-clip-scalia-structure-destiny [https://perma.cc/8VK4-CY9X].
203 THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
204 See Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1994)
(explaining that “it is unclear, in advance, whether a structure that violates the
constitutional blueprint is a benign innovation or a malignant threat to liberty”).
Therefore, McCutchen argues, the separation of powers is “prophylactic.” Id. at 11. The
idea of a prophylactic is that it prevents the creation of an untenable situation by
proceeding on the assumption that, in individual instances, it will be impossible to
determine the existence of a threat to the system’s underlying values. See Martin H. Redish
& Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation
of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 477 (1991). Treating the separation of powers as a
prophylactic rule thus requires courts to act in cases where that separation is implicated; it
is a “preventive methodology.” Id.
205 This is not meant to suggest that federal courts—including the Supreme Court—
conclusively and permanently define the Constitution. See Mitchell, supra note 195, at 936
(“[T]he [unconstitutional] statute continues to exist, even after a court opines that it
violates the Constitution, and it remains a law until it is repealed by the legislature that
enacted it.”). But see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (explaining that “the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is
the supreme law of the land”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 550–52
(2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting
the notion that the Supreme Court's interpretations of the Constitution are not the
Constitution itself). It should only be taken to mean that, because the Court goes last in
constitutional disputes, it is its judgment as to the boundaries of constitutional power by
which the parties to the case must abide, and by which future litigants would be prudent to
abide, lest they make an argument that precedent squarely forecloses.
206 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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with “the strong interest of the federal judiciary in maintaining the
constitutional plan of separation of powers.”207
The last of the case-by-case approach’s remedial shortcomings—
disincentivizing Congress from carefully crafting legislation—is
ameliorated by applying the per se approach. As discussed above, the
case-by-case approach’s use of the severability doctrine disincentivizes
Congress from taking care when drafting its legislation.208 Congress
has no incentive to do so when it knows that the Court will fix the
problem itself.209 On the contrary, applying the per se approach would
increase political pressure on Congress when plaintiffs successfully
challenge unconstitutional removal restrictions. Executive branch
enforcement actions are time-consuming and expensive.210 Were the
Court to set aside those actions (when taken unlawfully) without
presuming their constitutionality, a “redo” would be necessary.211
Under the per se approach, the Court would nullify the action, restore
the status quo ante, and give a lawfully constituted actor the chance to
independently decide how to proceed.
This litigation would be tedious and inefficient. The executive,
knowing what litigation is to come if Congress passes an
unconstitutional removal restriction, would ensure that the restriction
is constitutional before acting. If not, the executive would send the law
back to Congress so as to avoid future litigation. This process is itself
inefficient. The interbranch lawmaking incentive structure under the
per se approach thus places the onus on the branch best able to avoid
these negative externalities in the first place—the legislature.
CONCLUSION
Unconstitutional tenure protections that lead to unsupervised
executive overreach must be checked and challenged. When a
plaintiff does so successfully, that plaintiff should be made whole.
This Note has argued that when a plaintiff is injured by an
unconstitutionally tenure-protected executive official, doctrine and
207 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 536 (1962) (plurality opinion of Harlan, J.).
208 See Campbell, supra note 200, at 1519 (“[A] more limited use of severability . . .
would cause Congress and legislatures to devote more time to writing laws that are
constitutional in the first instance.”).
209 See id. at 1521 (“Congress passed a bill with several parts and even though the
product was flawed, Congress should have an opportunity to fix it.”).
210 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2022 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET
JUSTIFICATION 16 (2021) (showing the SEC’s 2022 enforcement budget request of
$638,972,000); FED. TRADE COMM’N, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FISCAL YEAR
2022 48 (2021) (showing total enforcement budget for fiscal year 2021 of $389,800,000).
211 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2423–24 (2019).
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policy justify a per se remedy. In examining the Supreme Court’s
treatment of other government-power problems, demonstrating the
virtues of the per se approach, and highlighting the weaknesses of the
case-by-case approach, this Note has built upon Justice Gorsuch’s
Collins concurrence.
It has advocated a straightforward and
constitutionally consistent remedial scheme which would solve the
Court’s current shortcomings in removal restriction remedies.
The days of removal restrictions may be numbered, as popular
skepticism of executive administration is on the rise.212 But for as long
as they are part of our government, they will bring with them the
temptations concomitant with unsupervised authority. While that is
the case, the people—and the courts—must remain wary of executive
overreach.213 Effectively redressing the targets of such overreach is a
step in that direction.

212 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 315 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(“[T]he danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be
dismissed.”). See generally Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1994).
213 The pace of tenure-protection litigation does not appear to be slowing. For a recent
challenge, see Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 986 F.3d 1173 (9th Cir. 2021), cert. granted in part,
Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (mem.). In Axon, the FTC brought an
enforcement action against Axon in an effort to prevent Axon from acquiring one of its
competitors. Id. at 1176. In response, Axon raised two challenges against the FTC in federal
district court. Id. First, Axon claimed that the district court, rather than the FTC’s
administrative process, was the proper forum to hear constitutional challenges (which Axon
was bringing) in the first instance. See id. And second, that the FTC’s structure—tenure
protection for both Commissioners and administrative law judges—violated the separation
of powers. See id. Although Axon “raise[d] substantial questions about whether the FTC’s
dual-layered for-cause protection for ALJs violates the President’s removal powers under
Article II,” the Ninth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Axon’s
claims. Id. at 1187. Because that issue was dispositive, the court did not reach the
constitutional question. Id. Axon petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and
presented two questions—the jurisdictional question and the tenure-protection question.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i–ii, Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 142 S. Ct. 895 (2022) (mem.)
(No. 21–86). The Supreme Court, alas, granted certiorari only as to the former. Axon
Enter., Inc., 142 S. Ct. 895.

